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The Status of Counterclaims in
International Law, With Particular
Reference to International Arbitration
Involving a Private Party and a Foreign
State
BRADLEY LARSCHAN* AND GUIVE MIRFENDERESKI**
I. INTRODUCTION
States generally make and receive counterclaims' when they wish to
settle sovereign accounts.2 Not all these accounts, or disputes, involve
some alleged wrong done by one State against another State. Most dis-
putes between States arise out of one State's public acts (jure imperii)
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1. For the purpose of this commentary, the term "counterclaim" is taken to mean "[a]
claim presented by a defendant opposition to or deduction from the claim of the plaintiff."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (5th ed. 1979), citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13. It is
recognized that a counterclaim is either an offensive or defensive plea. The former means
that the counterclaim is a cause of action and seeks affirmative relief, whereas the latter
seeks to defeat the plaintiff's cause of action and does not admit of affirmative relief to the
defendant. Id. It is also recognized that the terms "counterclaim," "set-off" and "recoup-
ment" tend to be used interchangeably in municipal and international legal practice even
though some argue that each term has a distinct legal meaning. For a discussion of the
difference between a set-off (demande de compensation) and a counterclaim (demande
reconventionelle) before international arbitral tribunals, see, e.g., J.L. SIMPSON & H. Fox,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 178, note 2 (1959) [hereinafter cited as SIMPSON & Fox]. See
also 4 A. CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 896 (3d ed. 1967). According to Corbin, a counter-
claim "mean[s] that the plaintiff has committed a breach of duty to the defendant. Each
party has done wrong; each is entitled to a remedy, although there must be an adjustment of
remedies." Id. A set-off is a "limited form of counter-claim, in ... which the adjustment of
remedies takes place by the mere process of subtraction." Id. Recoupment means "an ad-
justment of remedy, but without necessarily indicating that the plaintiff has done wrong so
that the defendant can establish a separate and independent claim to a remedy against the
plaintiff." Id.
2. See, e.g., 1 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 248-284 (1937) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1 WHITEMAN].
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
and private acts (jure gestiones)3 involving a national of another State.4
The settlement of a private party-foreign State dispute may be sought
through negotiation, litigation or arbitration.
An aggrieved private party's initial recourse is to seek redress in the
State which committed the wrong. Such recourse would include the ex-
haustion of both administrative and judicial remedies.5 If the injured pri-
vate party still believes it has been denied justice in the State which com-
mitted the wrong, it may then ask the State of which it is a national to
espouse its claim at the inter-state level.' If the State of the aggrieved
private party agrees to espouse the claim,7 the dispute is raised to a
purely international level.
At the international level, the dispute may also be resolved through
negotiation, litigation or arbitration. The negotiated settlement of sover-
eign accounts, for example, either through diplomatic correspondence or
actual bargaining, provides a flexible mechanism, especially insofar as the
making and receiving of counterclaims are concerned. This stems from
the fact that negotiation does not prohibit States from making and re-
ceiving counterclaims unrelated to the original claim.' To this extent, it
may be argued convincingly that the customary international law gov-
erning the settlement of sovereign accounts in a non-litigious setting, as
evidenced by the practice of States, does not mandate that counterclaims
be related to the original claim.' These international law rules governing
counterclaims between States in non-litigious proceedings are fairly well
3. The classification of State acts into acts jure imperii and jure gestionis, for the ben-
efit of American judicial proceedings involving a foreign Government, or agent or instru-
mentality thereof, was first made in a letter by Acting Legal Adviser to the State Depart-
ment, Jack B. Tate, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman, on May 19, 1952. For
the text of the "Tate Letter," see 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984 (1952). For an excellent discus-
sion of the jure imperii-jure gestionis distinction, see Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria
General de Abastecimientosy Transporter, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied 381 U.S.
934 (1965).
4. See generally 1 WHITEMAN, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 243, 244 (2d ed.
1976). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 206-
210 (1965)(hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT). See also Mummery, The Content of the
Duty to Exhaust Local Judicial Remedies, 58 Am. J.INT'L L. 389, 393-411 (1964). Exhaus-
tion of local remedies is, for example, required by the recent series of Investment Guaranty
Agreements between the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a U.S. Government
Agency, and foreign states. See, e.g., Investment Guaranty Agreement Between the United
States of America and Ecuador, art. 6(b).
6. For an excellent account of the procedure for submission of claims for espousal by
the United States government against a foreign government, see generally R. LILLICH &
CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION (1962).
7. See, e.g., Bagge, Intervention on the Ground of Damage Caused to Nationals, With
Particular Reference to Exhaustion of Local Remedies and the Rights of Shareholders, 34
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 162, 162-65 (1958).
8. See, e.g., 1 WHITEMAN, supra note 2, at 248-84.
9. Id.
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established and are quite liberal.' 0
There is also ample evidence demonstrating the existence of well-de-
fined rules of international law regarding the procedural admissibility of
counterclaims in State-to-State disputes before international courts and
arbitral tribunals. The procedural rules governing international judicial
and arbitral proceedings actually limit the jurisdiction of the forum to
consideration of counterclaims related to the original claim. This limita-
tion on unrelated counterclaims is not inherent in the international legal
order; rather, it is founded on limitations to which States have consented,
either directly or indirectly, by international conventions or bilateral arbi-
tral agreements.
This article will discuss the sources and extent of general rules of
international law'1 governing counterclaims in judicial and arbitral pro-
ceedings. Initially, the practice regarding counterclaims in the Permanent
Court of International Justice and its successor, the International Court
of Justice, is examined. The article then examines the permissibility of
counterclaims before international arbitral tribunals in State-to-State dis-
putes and disputes between private parties and States. The argument is
made that regardless of the status of the party making or receiving the
counterclaim, counterclaims must conform to two broad criteria. First,
counterclaims must relate to the original claim. Thus, without a claim
there can be no counterclaim. Second, the amount of the counterclaim
cannot exceed the amount of the original claim. The article concludes
with an analysis of the practice of Federal courts in the United States
governing counterclaims. Counterclaims in cases involving the actual par-
ties to a dispute have been allowed liberally in U.S. Federal courts. A far
more restrictive view has been taken of counterclaims against third party
assignees where the assignee is presenting the original claim. Particular
emphasis is placed on the treatment of these counterclaims in federal
courts as a possible source of analogy to international tribunals.12
II. COUNTERCLAIMS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS
Two bodies have qualified as "World Courts": the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ), established under the Covenant of the
League of Nations, and its successor, the International Court of Justice
10. Id.
11. There are four generally accepted sources of international law. See Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 38(1), which sets forth the sources of international law as
conventions, the practice of States (custom), general principles of international law, and in a
subsidiary capacity, the decisions of jurists (both municipal and international) and the opin-
ion of scholars. Id. For a more detailed analysis of the sources of international law, see
generally PARRY, THE SOURCE AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965).
12. For a discussion of the role of analogy in international law and the importation of
rules and principles of municipal law into international judicial and arbitral decisions, see
H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, wITH SPE-
cAL REFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1927).
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(ICJ). Both tribunals were established on a permanent basis to consider
State-to-State disputes by the consent of States Party. The procedural
rules of the Permanent Court of International Justice and its successor,
the International Court of Justice, are illustrative of international limita-
tions on counterclaims relating to the original claim.
A distinction must be drawn between what is purely a rule of coun-
terclaim and that which might appear as one but which is, on closer in-
spection, a rule of procedure developed by the jurisprudence of the two
World Courts and various arbitral tribunals relative to "joinder of sepa-
rate causes," "introduction of new claims" and/or "amendment of plead-
ings." This commentary will not deal with these latter issues."3
A. Practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice
Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided for the
establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice. 4 Under
the auspices of the League's Council and Assembly, a Protocol was
opened for signature by Member States to establish the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. 5 This Statute entered into
force in September 1921.16 Article 30 of the Statute empowered the Court
to formulate its own rules of procedure.' 7 The original Rules of Court
were adopted in March 1922."8 Article 40 of the Rules provided for the
joining of counterclaims to the proceedings only "in so far as [they came]
within the jurisdiction of the Court.""' Although this would appear to
state a liberal rule concerning counterclaims, some judges took the posi-
tion that counterclaims should not be allowed at all.
20
13. See generally, SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 1, at 179-183 (1959).
14. League of Nations Covenant art. 14. For a discussion of article 14, see M. HUDSON,
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: 1920-1942, 89-106 (1943) [hereinafter
cited as HUDSON].
15. Protocol of Signature Relating to the Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice Provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, signed
December 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 380.
16. HUDSON, supra note 14, at 119.
17. P.C.I.J. Statute art. 30. For a discussion of article 30, see HUDSON, supra note 14, at
254. For a lucid critique of the Court's construction of its jurisdiction so as to also extend to
the Polish counterclaim and a commentary about the reach of article 40 of the Rules of
Court, see Anzilotti, La Demande Reconventionelle en Procedure Internationale, 57 JouEt-
NAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 857, 867-877 (1930). Anzilotti states that the Court's jurisdic-
tion must be interpreted so as to extend only to counterclaims related to the principal ob-
ject of the claim. Id. at 876.
18. P.C.I.J. Ser. D, Acts and Documents concerning the organization of the Court, § 7,
66 (1926).
19. Id. § 7, at 75. Article 40 provided, inter alia, that "[clounter-caseb shall contain: (1)
the affirmation or contestation of the facts stated in the case; (2) a statement of additional
facts, if any; (3) a statement of law; (4) conclusions based on the facts stated; these conclu-
sions may include counterclaims, in so far as the latter come within the jurisdiction of the
Court; (5) a list of the documents in support; these documents shall be attached to the
counter-case."
20. See P.C.I.J. Ser. D, No. 2 (4th Add.) 261-63 (1936).
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The first case interpreting article 40 was the Chorzow Factory Case2
involving German Government claims against Poland over the expropria-
tion of a factory in Upper Silesia. The Court held that to be procedurally
permissible, a counterclaim based upon article 40 must be "juridically
connected with the principal claim."2 As the German claims met this
"relatedness" criterion, they were allowed but then were ultimately dis-
missed on the merits.23
In 1936 the Court promulgated a revised set of Rules2 ' which nar-
rowed and defined the scope of permissible counterclaims.2 5 Article 63 al-
lowed the presentation of a counterclaim provided that it was (1)
presented in the submissions of the Counter-Memorial; (2) "directly con-
nected with the subject of the application"; and, (3) "within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court. '26 Article 63 also provided for the procedure to be fol-
lowed for any claim which was not directly connected with the subject
matter of the original application. Such a claim, really an offensive coun-
terclaim or cross-action, 27 was to be put forward by means of a separate
application, in which case it would "form the subject of distinct proceed-
ings" or "be joined by the Court to the original proceedings."2 The Court
was thus to be the sole determinor of whether a claim not directly con-
nected to the original application was to be allowed as a counterclaim
related to the original claim. 0 Implicit in the Court's discretion, however,
was the limitation that in allowing a counterclaim, the Court could not
"assume a jurisdiction it would otherwise lack." 0
21. Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. Ser.
A, No. 17 (Judgment of Sept. 13, 1928).
22. Id. at 38.
23. Id. The Court refused to consider the applicant's motion to bar a submission for a
setoff by the respondent. Id. at 60-63, 64.
24. P.C.I.J. Ser. D, No. 1, 9, 28 (3rd Add. 1936) [hereinafter cited as 1936 Rules of the
Court].
25. I. SHIHATA, THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE TO DETERMINE ITS
OWN JURISDICTION 262-63 (1965).
26. Id. at 49. Article 63 provides that:
When proceedings have been instituted by means of an application, a counter-
claim may be presented in the submission of the Counter-Memorial, provided
that such counterclaim is directly connected with the subject of the application
and that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Any claim which is not
directly connected with the subject of the original application must be put for-
ward by means of a separate application and may form the subject of distinct
proceedings or be joined by the Court to the original proceedings.
Id.
27. HUDSON, supra note 14, at 322. See also P.C.I.J. Ser.D, No. 2, at 111 (3rd Add.
1936); and, Harvard Research in International Law, Competence of Courts in Regard to
Foreign States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 453, 490 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Harvard
Research].
28. See 1936 Rules of the Court, supra note 24, at 49.
29. Id.
30. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 364 (1945).
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B. Practice of the International Court of Justice
Article 63's legacy survives and is codified in article 80 of the Rules
of the International Court of Justice,' which were adopted by the Court
in 1978. Article 93(1) of the United Nations Charter provides that all
Members of the U.N. are also parties to the Statute of the ICJ.32 Article
30 of the Court's Statute empowers the Court to establish its own proce-
dural rules.33 Exercising this prerogative, and based on the consent of
states implied through the constitutional chain of the U.N.,3" the Court
promulgated article 80 of its Rules on counterclaims.
Article 80 permits the presentation of a counterclaim if it is (1)
presented in the submission of the Counter-Memorial; (2) "directly con-
nected with the subject matter of the claim of the other party;" and (3)
"within the jurisdiction of the Court."3 The remainder of article 80 deals
with the procedural permissibility of a counterclaim whose connection
with the subject matter of the application is . in doubt. In such a case,
article 80 provides that "[t]he Court shall, after hearing the parties, di-
rect whether or not the question thus presented shall be joined to the
original proceedings." As with article 63 of the PCIJ's rules, the Court
reserves the right to determine whether a counterclaim unrelated to the
original application should be joined to the proceeding.36 If the Court
finds against the permissibility of a State's counterclaim, the counter-
claimant State may file a separate application.
The only case in which the Court appears to have interpreted article
80 (actually article 63 of the Rules of Court adopted in 1946) is in the
31. DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 256-57 (S. Rosenne ed. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenne]. For the text of article 80, see infra note 35. The 1978 Rules
of the Court are the third set issued by the I.C.J. The first Rules of the Court were issued in
1946. Article 63 of the 1946 Rules took verbatim the counterclaim provisions of article 63 of
the P.C.I.J.'s 1936 Rules. For the text of article 63 of the 1946 Rules, see I.C.J. Ser. D, No. 1
Acts and Documents Concerning the Organization of the Court, Rules of Court 54, 74;
Rosenne, 177. The 1972 Rules of the Court again used precisely the same language on coun-
terclaims as in article 63. See id. For a comparative list of provisions of the three sets of
Rules of the Court, see [1977-1978] I.C.J.Y.B. 113, 188 (1978).
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 93(1).
33. I.C.J. Statute art. 30.
34. Id.
35. Article 80 provides that:
1. A counterclaim may be presented provided that it is direclty connected
with the subject matter of the claim of the other party and that it comes
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. A counterclaim shall be made in the Counter-Memorial of the party
presenting it, and shall appear as part of the submissions of that party.
3. In the event of doubts as to the connection between the question
presented by way of counter-claim and the subject matter of the claim of the
other party the Court shall, after hearing the parties, decide whether or not the
question thus presented shall be joined to the original proceedings.
Id. See also Rosenne, supra note 31, at 256-57.
36. Rosenne, supra note 31 at 257.
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Asylum Case.3 7 Colombia sought safe conduct from Peru for the Peruvian
politician Haya de la Torre, to whom the Colombian ambassador in Lima
had granted asylum in its embassy. Peru counterclaimed that notwith-
standing its obligations, if any, to allow the safe conduct, the grant of
asylum was in violation of Colombia's treaty obligations.3" The Court, ob-
serving that "[tihe direct connexion being thus clearly established
.... ,, permitted the counterclaim under article 63.
In both the PCIJ and the ICJ, the ultimate resolution of disputes
originally arising between a private party claimant and a respondent
State must clear two procedural hurdles. First, under article 34(1) of the
ICJ's Statute, "[o]nly States may be parties in cases before the Court. '40
This procedural hurdle is surmountable by the private party only if the
State of which it is a national chooses to espouse its national's claim and
thereby elevate the dispute to the inter-state level.' There is another
hurdle to overcome, however, for the successful submission of a private
party's claim to the Court: the exhaustion of local remedies.' 2
C. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
The exhaustion of local remedies requirement is a basic principle of
international law.'3 In the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case,"' the
Permanent Court of International Justice decided not to "entertain" the
Estonian claim because the Esimene Juurdeveo Raudteede Selts
Venemaal Company, the owners and concessionaires of the expropriated
railroad, had not exhausted local remedies available to it in Lithuania. 5
A similar situation arose in The Interhandel Case when Switzerland
made a claim for restitution of assets of one of its nationals,' 6 which had
been seized by the U. S. Government as enemy property during the Sec-
ond World War. Rather than actively participate in the procedures avail-
able in the U. S. district courts, Switzerland took its claim to the ICJ.
37. Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Judgment).
38. Id. at 280.
39. Id. at 281.
40. I.C.J. Statute art. 34(1).
41. As Judge Moore states: "It is an elementary principle that, when a government offi-
cially intervenes on behalf of its citizens, it makes his claim its own. . ." The Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions Case, 1926 P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 2, at 63 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Moore). See generally, STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 5, at 243-244; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 5, at § 212; Bagge, supra note 7, at 162-65.
42. See Mummery, supra note 5, at 389-96; Bagge, supra note 7, at 165-66.
43. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at 206; Finnish Shipowners (Finland v. Great
Britain), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1479 (1934); Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. Great Britain), 12
U.N.R.I.A.A. 82 (1956), 23 I.L.R. 106-40 (Lauterpacht ed. 1960); Interhandel Case (Switzer-
land v. United States), 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Objections).
44. Panevezys Saldutiskis Railway Case (Estonia v. Lithuania), 1939 P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B,
No. 76.
45. Id. at 19, 21.
46. Interhandel Case, 1959 I.C.J. 6. The facts of this case are conveniently summarized
in 8 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 794-801 (1967).
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The ICJ refused to adjudicate the dispute because Interhandel, a Swiss
corporation, had failed to exhaust local remedies available to it in the
United States.47
D. Summary
The Permanent Court of International Justice formulated a rather
narrow interpretation of permissible counterclaims. 48 This interpretation
was adopted by the International Court of Justice, reinforcing the inter-
national legal status of the rule. Although substantial discretion is left to
the Court in deciding whether to join the counterclaim to the original
application, the procedural rules contemplate the permissibility of coun-
terclaims directly related to the original claim. There is no evidence that
the Court has sought to enlarge this rather narrow rule.
III. AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF COUNTERCLAIMS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS
The history of modern international arbitration between States and
private parties is less than a century and a half old.49 As with counter-
claims in international adjudication, the development of the procedural
rule relative to counterclaims in international arbitration stems from con-
ventions and international common law.
Early in this century, Jackson Ralston observed that: "Ordinarily at
least, questions of set-off and counterclaim do not, and in the nature of
things cannot, arise before an international tribunal."' This statement
was no more wholly valid when made in 1926 than the assertion by
Anzilotti four years later: "Ii ne pouvait, evidemment, pas 6tre question
de demande reconventionelle dans la procedure internationale, tant que
la seule forme judicaire de solution des litiges entre Etats a tk
rarbitrage, au sens etroit du mot." 1 In fact, prior to Ralston and
Anzilotti, international arbitral tribunals had indeed considered the ques-
tion of counterclaims as a matter of jurisprudential reasoning, indepen-
dent of the provisions of the arbitral agreement (compromis).
47. Interhandel at 26-30.
48. See C. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL AREITRAL PROCEDURE 132 (1930).
49. See generally, T. BALCH, INTERNATIONAL COURTS OF ARBITRATION (1874), K. CARL-
STON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1946), W. DARBY, INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRATION (4th ed. 1904), D. MYERS, ARBITRATION IN THE AMERICAS (1932), J. RALSTON, INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1910), and J. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS To LOCARNO (1929).
50. J. RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS § 376, 211
(1926).
51. Anzilotti, La Demande Reconventionelle en Procedure Internationale, 57 JOURNAL
DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 857 (1930) ("A counterclaim cannot be part of an international
proceeding in the strict legal sense.")
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A. Earlier Cases
One of the earliest cases considering counterclaims by an arbitral tri-
bunal was in 1898 in South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-
Belge du Chemin de Fer du Nord.2 The South African Republic brought
suit to compel the appointment of a new trustee for certain funds depos-
ited in England in connection with the building of a railroad for which
the respondent Belgian corporation had a concession. The respondent
counterclaimed, alleging various breaches by the Plaintiff-Government of
the terms of the concession, the writing of a libelous letter by the plain-
tiff's agent, and the injustice and bad faith of the plaintiff in instituting
proceedings in the Transvaal courts to avoid the concession. In rejecting
the counterclaim, Justice North agreed with the decision by Lord
Langdale, Master of the Rolls, in the early case of Charles Duke of
Brunswick v. The King of Hanover" in holding that, although a counter-
claim might be made if related to the subject matter of the suit, under
the United Kingdom's interpretation of international law a counterclaim
could not be made for matters "entirely outside of and independent of
the subject matter of the present action."" The British interpretation of
international law was that counterclaims were permissible only if they re-
lated to the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim.
B. The Carthage and Manouba Cases
The issue of counterclaims was also addressed in 1913 by a tribunal
organized under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 5 to
arbitrate the Carthage and Manouba cases. This pair of cases stemmed
from the seizure and detention of two French vessels by Italy in 1912
during the Turko-Italian war over Tripoli and Cyrenaica. In the Carthage
case," the Tribunal held that the Italian navy violated international law
by capturing and temporarily detaining the French mail steamer "Car-
thage".5 7 The Tribunal awarded France 160,000 francs for the loss and
damage to private parties.58 The Tribunal considered but ultimately dis-
missed the Italian counterclaim for 2,075.25 frantps to cover the expense
incurred by the seizure of the steamer.5 9
52. South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du Nord
[1898] L.R. Ch. 190.
53. Charles Duke of Brunswick v. The King of Hanover, 6 Bevan 1, 37, 38 [1844].
54. South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du Nord
[1898] L.R. Ch. 190.
55. For a discussion of the Permanent Court of Arbitration see infra text accompanying
notes 115-122, 132-141.
56. The Carthage Case (France v. Italy), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award of
May 6, 1913, reprinted in J. B. ScoTT, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 330 (2d. ser. 1916).
57. Id. at 336.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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In the Manouba case,60 the Tribunal decided that the Italian navy
violated international law by capturing the French steamer "Manouba"
and directing its convoy to Cagliari.6 France was awarded 4,000 francs as
compensation for the loss and damage sustained by its nationals.6 2 The
Tribunal held, however, that once at Cagliari, the Italian navy could ar-
rest twenty-nine Ottoman passengers on board."3 The Tribunal, therefore,
allowed the Italian counterclaim for the expenses incurred in guarding
the "Manouba" at Cagliari," and ordered that the amount of the counter-
claim be deducted from the 4,000 francs awarded to France."5 It is worth
noting that the two compromis establishing the Tribunal were silent on
the issue of counterclaims.66
C. Post-World War I Tribunals
In spite of these precedents, Ralston chose to base his aforemen-
tioned observation, relative to the place of counterclaims in international
arbitration, on the circumstances surrounding the Del Rio Case"7 . In that
case, when Mexico presented its claims against Venezuela to the Mexi-
can-Venezuelan Claims Commission in 1903, an exchange of notes be-
tween the parties rather than a single private claim presented by Mexico
was deemed necessary to authorize the Commission to take jurisdiction of
any counterclaim which might be presented by Venezuela.68
Most significantly, what may have contributed to the observations by
Ralston and Anzilotti appears to have been the fact that the Rules of
Procedure of three tribunals (the Belgo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribu-
nals) established pursuant to article 304 of the Treaty of Versailles 6 be-
tween Germany and three of the Allied Powers (Britain, Belgium and Po-
land) explicitly prohibited the consideration of counterclaims (demande
reconventionelle) by the Tribunals." Yet, in this context there were also
60. The Manouba Case (France v. Italy), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award of
May 6, 1912, reprinted in J. B. SCOTT, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 330 (2d. ser. 1916).
61. Id. at 350-51.
62. Id. at 351.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 345-46.
65. Id. at 351.
66. See Compromis of Arbitration Relative to the Question Raised by the Capture and
Temporary Detention of the French Mail Steamer "Carthage," signed in Paris, March 6,
1912 (France and Italy), in ScoTr, supra note 56, at 336-38; Compromis of Arbitration rela-
tive to the Question raised by the Capture and Temporary Detention of the French Mail
Steamer, "Manouba", signed in Paris, March 6, 1912 (France and Italy), in SCOTT, id., at
351-53.
67. Del Rio Case (Mexico v. Venezuela), Ven. Arb. of 1903, at 879 (1903).
68. RALSTON, supra note 50, at § 376, 211.
69. 3 REDMOND, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREE-
MENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS 3477 (1923).
70. For example, article 13 of the Anglo-German Mixed Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib. Arb.
Mixtes 109 (1921-1922), at 111, provides: "Should the Respondent desire to make a claim
against the Claimant, he must do so by a separate claim, and not by a counterclaim, but the
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tribunals whose rules of procedure provided for admission of counter-
claims.7 1 In other instances, the rules of procedure of a few tribunals were
silent on the issue of counterclaims.
7 2
What has gone unmentioned by Ralston and Anzilotti is that despite
the procedural rule prohibiting the admission of counterclaims, the
Belgo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal succeeded, in effect, in admitting
counterclaims under the procedurally permissible concept of requete in-
troductive d'instance (i.e., request for separate cause application), which
the Tribunal could join to the original proceedings. 73
Two cases illustrate this point. In Installations maritimes de Bruges
v. Hamburg Amerika Linie,74 the plaintiff sought 126,000 francs in dam-
ages arising out of the defendant's non-payment of sums owed to the
plaintiff.7 5 The defendant, in the person of its branch in Anvers, counter-
claimed for more than 66,000 francs in damages arising out of a collision
between two steamers and a seawall at the port of Zeebruge, administered
by the plaintiff.7 s Since the Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal did not
permit counterclaims,7 7 the defendant filed its twin counterclaims by way
of requete introductive d'instance.7' The Tribunal held that the two
Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, hear both claims at the same hearing." Id. Similarly, article 29
of the Belgo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 33 (1921-1922), at
36-37, provides: "Les demandes reconventionelles ne sont pas admises. Toute demande du
defendeur contre le demandeur doit etre formee par une requete introductive d'instance. Le
Tribunal purra adonner quel les causes soient jointes ou qu'elles soint plaidees dans la
meme audience." Id. A similar wording appears in article 28 of the German-Polish Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 687, 691 (1921-1922).
71. For example, article 27 of Anglo-Austrian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib.
Arb. Mixtes 622, 626-627 (1921-1922) states: "Where the defendant raises a counterclaim it
shall have the same effect as a separate claim and the Tribunal may pronounce a final judg-
ment in the same cause both on the original and on the cross-claim. If, however, in the
opinion of the Tribunal, such counterclaim cannot be conveniently disposed of with the
claim, the Tribunal may order that no further proceedings thereon be allowed until its de-
livery as a separate claim in a new cause." Id. A similar language is contained in article 27 of
Anglo-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 639, 643 (1921-1922).
72. See, e.g., Greco-Austrian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 672
(1921-1922); Austria-Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes Mixed Arbitral Tribunal
Rules, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 698 (1921-1922).
73. See supra note 70.
74. Installations maritimes de Bruges v. Hamburg-Amerika Linie (Belgium v. Ger-
many), 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 877 (1921-1922)
75. Id. at 877.
76. Id.
77. Article 29 of the Rules of the Belgo-German Arbitral Tribunal, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes
33, 36-37 (1921-1922) provides: "Les demandes reconventionelles ne sont pas admisees.
Toute demande du defendeur contre le demandeur doit etre formee par une requete intro-
ductive d'instance. Le Tribunal pourra ordonner que les causes soient jointes ou qu'elles
soient plaidees dans la meme audience." Id.
78. Supra note 74, at 877. There does not seem to be an adequate translation for the
term "requete introductive d'instance." As it is used in article 2 of the rules of the Tribunal,
id., the term asks the defendant to bring its action against the plaintiff by way of requesting
for the introduction of such an action at the start of the proceedings. In this respect the
formulation of this part of article 2 resembles article 63 of the Rules of the Permanent
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counterclaims "[arose] out of the same fact as the claim" and, therefore,
it ordered the actions to be joined. 9
Similarly, in Peeters, von Haute et Duyver v. Trommer et Gruber,8"
the Belgo-German Tribunal was requested to admit a counterclaim which
its rules prohibited it from admitting.8 1 The case involved the perform-
ance of a contract between the Belgian and German parties, whereby the
Belgian plaintiff sold to the German defendant nine carpets, which the
defendant lost while transporting them to Germany. Additionally, the de-
fendant was to make lithographite stones for the plaintiff.2 The plaintiff
demanded the purchase price of the carpets as yet unpaid by the defend-
ant. The defendant counterclaimed in the amount of the cost of making
the printing slabs.8 " The Tribunal admitted the counterclaim, stating that
it was not a counterclaim (demande reconventionelle) within the meaning
of article 29, but rather it was a demande de compensation (set-off)
based on one claim born from the same case.8 4 Accordingly, the Tribunal
deducted the amount of the counterclaim from the award made for the
plaintiff.8 5
The Anglo-German Tribunal has also admitted counterclaims in a
number of cases, even though article 13 of the Rules of the Tribunal pro-
hibited the respondent from making a claim against the claimant by way
of a counterclaim.8 In The Empire Transport Co., Ltd. v. Bd. Blumen-
feld,87 the Tribunal held in an interlocutory decision that a claim for un-
liquidated damages could be set up as a ground for the reduction of a
debt if it arose out of the same transaction and its ascertainment was
merely a matter of calculation.8
An opposite result was reached in Nitrogen Fertilizers Ltd. v.
Verkaufe Vereinigung fuer Stickstoffsdunger G.m.b.H.,8 9 where the Ger-
man debtors were not allowed to counterclaim against a British firm for
certain legal expenses incurred when the debtors were sued by their Ger-
man customers. The counterclaim was based on the allegation that the
Court of International Justice (see supra notes 24-28 and corresponding text), in which it is
provided that an offensive counterclaim (or cross action) be put forward by means of a
separate application, which, according to the decision of the Court, it could have joined to
the original proceedings.
79. Supra note 74, at 877.
80. Peeters, van Haute et Duyver v. Trommer et Gruber (Belgium v. Germany), 2 Trib.
Arb. Mixtes 384 (1922-1923).
81. See supra note 70.
82. Supra note 80, at 391-394.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 394.
85. Id. at 394-395.
86. See supra note 70.
87. The Empire Transport Co., Ltd. v. Bd. Blumenfeld (Great Britain v. Germany), 4
Trib. Arb. Mixtes 205 (1924-1925).
88. Id. at 207-208.
89. Nitrogen Fertilizers Ltd. v. Verkaufe Vereinigung fuer Stickstoffsdunger G.m.b.H.
(Great Britain v. Germany), 5 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 648 (1926).
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German debtors were not able to deliver the material for which they had
made contracts when the British creditors failed to deliver lime nitrogen
to the debtors. The Tribunal held that the debtors were not allowed to
set-off their purchases of lime nitrogen from a Norwegian company be-
longing to the creditors which were made so that they could comply with
their contracts with German purchasers. 90 Further, the debtors were not
allowed to make a counterclaim for damages for breach of contract when
the creditors failed to deliver the specified quantity of lime nitrogen dur-
ing the war, since their obligation was extinguished by the outbreak of
the War (under article 299 of the Treaty of Versailles) and did not arise
out of the deliveries at issue in the creditor's claim."1 The debtors were
allowed to counterclaim for the amount of a penalty incurred by the cred-
itors as a result of a breach of the agreement before the outbreak of the
war.
92
In Ernest Epstein v. German Government,93 the Tribunal held in an
interlocutory decision that the claimant was entitled to recover the pro-
ceeds of the sale of its pictures that had been sold by the compulsory
administrator, together with the proceeds of pictures sold before the ad-
ministrator was appointed, less certain deductions, including payments
made by the administrator for taxes on the claimant's behalf and at its
request, but not for debts of the firm of which the claimant was a
partner."
In The Vandyck Printers Ltd. v. Moderner Kunst-Belag G.m.b.H.,"
the Tribunal ruled that the debtor's claim for unliquidated damages, aris-
ing out of an entirely different transaction, could not form the basis of a
counterclaim against a creditor's claim under article 296 of the Treaty of
Versailles." In Morgan and Co. v. W.H. Chaplin and Co. Ltd., 7 the Tri-
bunal reached a similar result and held that a counterclaim for unliqui-
dated damages arising from a separate transaction could not be set up as
a counterclaim under the Treaty of Versailles. 98
Finally, in The Beeley Wood Steel Co., Ltd. v. Franz and Mass-
mann,99 a British seller brought a claim against German buyers, Franz
and Massmann, for the balance of the price of steel stipulated to the Ger-
90. Id. at 655.
91. Id. at 656.
92. Id. at 656-657.
93. Ernest Epstein v. German Government (Great Britain v. Germany), 6 Trib. Arb.
Mixtes 19 (1926-1927).
94. Id. at 20-21.
95. The Vandyck Printers Ltd. v. Moderner Kunst-Belag G.m.b.H. (Great Britain v.
Germany), 6 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 33 (1926-1927).
96. Id. at 33-34.
97. Morgan & Co. v. W.H. Chaplin & Co. Ltd. (Great Britain v. Germany), 6 Trib. Arb.
Mixtes 43 (1926-1927).
98. Id. at 43-44.
99. The Beeley Wood Steel Co. Ltd. v. Franz and Massmann (Great Britain v. Ger-
many), 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 289 (1928-1929).
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man buyers during the years 1911-1913. The German buyers presented a
counterclaim for damages due to imperfections in the steel. In an interim
decision, the Tribunal held that a counterclaim, though not liquidated,
could be set up against another claim if it arose out of the same contract
or transaction. The set-off was allowed on the ground that "each of the
orders formed part of a series which by their connection is for this pur-
pose to be considered one transaction.'
'10 0
D. Recent Cases
The most recent decisions concerning the international legal status of
counterclaims have come from the arbitral tribunal at The Hague which
was established in 1981 to settle certain financial matters between the
United States and Iran.' 0' The agreement establishing the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal sets forth the principle that claims can be made
only by private parties against the foreign government, or an entity
thereof, and that counterclaims may be brought only if they "arise . . .
out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the
subject matter of [the] claim."' 1 2 This principle was found to be disposi-
tive in a recent decision of the Tribunal, T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran.103
T.C.S.B., Inc., a Maryland corporation, was given a 51 month con-
tract as a consulting engineer beginning in May 1975 to supervise con-
struction of a large housing project to be built near Shiraz, Iran. T.C.S.B.
brought four separate claims against Iran for breach of contract totalling
100. Id. at 291.
101. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Alge-
ria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, art. 2, signed and entered
into force Jan. 19, 1981 (Algeria, Iran & United States), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 230 (1981), 1
Iran-U.S. Claim Trib. Rep. 9 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Claims Settlement Declaration].
102. Id. art. 2(1). In the Case Concerning Jurisdiction of the Tribunal With Respect To
Claims By The Islamic Republic of Iran Against Nationals of the United States of America,
decision of Dec. 21, 1981, 1 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. 101 (1983), the Full Tribunal held
that "a right of counter claim is normal for a respondent, but it is admitted only in response
to a claim and it does not mean, by analogy, that each State is allowed to submit claims
against nationals of the other State. It means, a contrario, just the opposite." Id. at 103. In
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Government of Iran, decision of May 13, 1983, 2 IRAN-
U.S. CLAIMS Tam. REP. 322 (Interlocutory Award) (1984), the tribunal observed that the
Claims Settlement Declaration counterclaim provision in article 2(1), supra note 88, "sug-
gests that 'contract,' 'transaction' and 'occurrence' are alternative" as they are "in the dis-
junctive." 2 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tam. REP. at 324. The Tribunal went on to note that "if a
claim is based solely on a contract, a counterclaim must arise from the same contract to be
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Similarly, if a claim is for an occurrence, such as a
taking of property, then a counterclaim would have to arise out of that same occurrence."
Id. The Tribunal specifically reserved interpreting the latitude for counterclaims under the
transactional provision. Id. In American Bell International, however, the tribunal enunci-
ated a narrow transactional standard. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
103. T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140, Chamber
2, at 23-24.
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nearly $4.5 million. Iran filed several counterclaims, one of which alleged
that, inter alia, T.C.S.B. failed to pay certain social security taxes. The
Tribunal dismissed the counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction.'" In a
straight forward application of the rules of the compromis, the Tribunal
observed that "a distinction must be made . . . between legal relation-
ships arising out of the application of the law to a situation in which ei-
ther party individually finds itself and the contractual relationship be-
tween the parties to the contract inter se."' 0 T.C.S.B. was awarded
slightly over $1 million.0 6
In American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran,""7 the
Tribunal considered the permissibility of a number of counterclaims. In
May 1975, American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) was chosen by the
Iranian Government to oversee the modernization of civilian and military
communications throughout Iran. AT&T and Iran's Government entered
into an initial three and one half month agreement to organize the pro-
ject. In order to perform the project, AT&T created, with the consent of
Iran, a wholly-owned subsidiary, American Bell International (ABI). Sub-
sequently, ABI entered into two long-term contracts with the Govern-
ment of Iran to provide consulting services. ABI brought a claim against
Iran for $63.8 million for its services, equipment and other expenses
under these two contracts. Iran filed seven counterclaims exceeding $285
million against ABI and its parent, AT&T, for a variety of alleged con-
tractual breaches and violations of Iranian law. In an interlocutory award,
the Tribunal held that Iran could not counterclaim against AT&T and
was "barred from asserting any counterclaims against any person or en-
tity other than [the] claimant itself . . ."108 Iran asserted in the alterna-
tive that if it could not maintain a counterclaim against AT&T, it could
nevertheless counterclaim against ABI under the original contract with
AT&T. The Tribunal agreed with the Iranian position, finding "that the
linkage between all three contracts must be considered sufficiently strong
so as to make them form one single 'transaction' . . ."'09 The Tribunal
observed that ABI was the successor to AT&T under the original contract
and, as such, was liable for a breach of the contract.11
104. Id. at 24.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. American Bell International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, June 11, 1984, Case
No. 48, Chamber 3, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tam. REP. (1984).
108. Id. at 15.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. However, in Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Government of Iran, decision
of May 13, 1983, 2 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. 322 (Interlocutory Award 1984), the tribu-
nal rejected an Iranian contention that it could couterclaim against Owens-Corning for al-
leged actions by the French Government-owned company Saint Gobain Pont a Mousson and
its licensing subsidiary, Sodefive. Owens-Coming and Saint Gorbain had entered into a
cross-licensing agreement with Glass Wool Co. of Iran. When Owens-Corning filed a claim
for royalties, Glass Wool counterclaimed for acts and omissions by Saint Gorbain on the
theory that Owens-Corning was the French guarantor or, alternatively, that Saint Govain
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E. Summary
This brief historical sketch illustrates the significant role which inter-
national arbitral tribunals, particularly those established in the aftermath
of World War I between the Allied Powers (not including the United
States) and Germany, have played in the development and refinement of
the concept of counterclaims in international law. The rules relative to
counterclaims in international arbitration-which had gone unnoticed by
Ralston and Anzilotti in the nascent stage of its emergence some five and
a half decades ago-have advanced to such a degree that the state of the
law is no longer confined to the broad rule allowing admission of counter-
claims so long as they are related to the original claim."' The progressive
development and refinement by international tribunals of the rules gov-
erning counterclaims has been such that it now permits distinctions be-
tween a counterclaim (demande reconventione le) and set-off (demande
de compensation),"2 a distinction which until 1923 had been confined to
municipal systems based on Roman Law." s Equally remarkable is the in-
creased incorporation into international law of a refinement of the con-
cept of counterclaims beyond those arising merely out of and relating to
the original claim to include "counterclaims arising out of the same con-
tract, transaction or occurrence." ' "
4
IV. PERMISSIBILITY OF COUNTERCLAIMS AS CODIFIED BY INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL CONVENTIONS, RULES, AND INSTITUTIONS
In the preceding sections, it was shown that international courts and
arbitral tribunals, by their decisions and in accordance with their rules of
procedure, have contributed to the emergence and development of inter-
national law rules governing counterclaims. Attempts at the codification
of counterclaim rules by international arbitral conventions, model rules,
and institutions have also played a role in the evolution of the rules gov-
erning counterclaims. This section is divided into two parts. First, it will
was Owens-Cornings's agent. 2 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tim. REP. at 323-24. The Tribunal held
that Owens-Corning had entered into separate, albeit related, countracts with Glass Wool.
Id. at 325-26.
111. See also, 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 240, n. 1 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed.
1955).
112. See, e.g., Article 19 of Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) [issued at the ninth session of the Commission's
work on 12 April-7 May 1976, Doc. No. A/31/17]. Article 19(3) states: "the respondent may
make a counter-claim arising out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the
same contract for the purpose of a set-off." Id. Presently, Article 19 as well as the remainder
of UNCITRAL rules, some modified and some in whole, form the Arbitration Rules gov-
erning the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Final
Tribunal Rules of Procedure, May 3, 1983, in 2 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tsm. REP. 405, 423-424
(1983).
113. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 1, at 178.
114. This enumeration is contained in Article 2(1) of the Claims Settlement Declara-
tion, supra note 102, which established the Iran-U.S. claims Tribunal.
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examine the codification of counterclaim rules by international arbitral
conventions, model rules and institutions for the exclusive purpose of ap-
plying them to arbitral proceedings involving states (i.e., codification of
counterclaim rules in public international arbitral codes). This section
will then discuss codification of counterclaim rules by international arbi-
tral conventions, model rules and institutions for the exclusive and/or
primary purpose of applying them to arbitral proceedings in which at
least one of the parties is a private actor (i.e., codification of counterclaim
rules in private international arbitral codes).
A. Counterclaims in Public International Arbitral Codes
1. The Permanent Court of International Arbitration
One year after the decision in the South African Republic case, 11 5 the
cause of international arbitration in general was furthered by the conclu-
sion of the Hague Convention on Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes (the 1899 Hague Convention)."1 ' This convention established the
Permanent Court of International Arbitration." 7 In 1907, the Second
Hague Convention on Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (the
1907 Hague Convention)" 8 extended the life of the Permanent Court of
International Arbitration and adopted a revised and expanded set of pro-
cedural rules for the court. " This, as well as the earlier set of procedural
rules, made no mention of counterclaims. This omission appears to have
stemmed from the fact that the Permanent Court of International Arbi-
tration was intended to be neither permanent nor a court. 2 ' It was,
rather, to be an administrative organ to which States could resort to cre-
ate an arbitral tribunal whose composition, procedure, and jurisdiction
were to be defined and set out by the disputant States in an arbitral
agreement or compromis.1" It was therefore natural that the 1899 and
1907 rules made no mention of counterclaims; the issue was intended to
be left to the compromis or the jurisprudence of the duly constituted tri-
bunal on a case-by-case, tribunal-by-tribunal basis. The very first in-
stance in which a tribunal organized under the auspices of the Permanent
Court of International Arbitration addressed a counterclaims issue was in
115. South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin du Chemin de
Fer du Nord [1898 L.R. Ch. 190. Discussed supra in text accompanying notes 52-54.
116. Convention for the Peaceful Adjustment of International Differences, concluded
at The Hague on July 29, 1899, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L. L. Supp. 107 (1907) [hereinafter
cited as the 1899 Hague Convention).
117. Id. art. 20.
118. The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, con-
cluded at The Hague on October 18, 1907, reprinted in 2 Am. J. INT'L. L. StPr. 43 (1908)
[hereinafter cited as the 1907 Hague Convention].
119. Id. art. 14
120. See HUDSON, supra note 14, at 1-7.
121. See articles 24, 31-32 of the 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 117, and articles
52-53, 73 of the 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 119. See also HUDsoN, supra note 14, at
1-7.
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the Carthage and Manouba cases, for which the compromis were silent
on the issue of counterclaims.""2
2. International Central American Tribunal (1923)
In 1923, a decade after the decisions in the Carthage and Manouba
cases, five Central American countries entered into a convention (the
Central American Convention) for the establishment of the International
Central American Tribunal.12 3 This Convention adopted, in very large
measure, the terms of the 1907 Hague Convention, 124 which had extended
the life of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Unlike the 1907 Hague
Convention, however, the Central American Convention cannot be said to
have been silent on the matter of counterclaims. The Convention appears
to have addressed the issue of counterclaims when it provided that in an
action by one Government against another, "[c]laims or disputes which
do not necessarily follow from the principal action, or which do not in-
volve a dispute over the rights of third parties ... shall not be accepted
as incidental questions. '126 The Central American Convention thus con-
templated a rather narrow approach to counterclaims between States.
3. The United Nations International Law Commission Model
Rules on Arbitral Procedure (1958)
In 1958, the United Nations International Law Commission pub-
lished its Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure.1 26 Article 19 of the Rules
provided that "[ijn the absence of any agreement to the contrary implied
by the undertaking to arbitrate or contained in the compromis, the tribu-
nal shall decide on any ancillary claims which it considers to be insepara-
ble from the subject-matter of the dispute and necessary for its final set-
tlement. 11 7 According to the preamble of the Model Rules, this article as
well as the rest of the provisions apply to disputes between States. 28 The
preamble also indicates that the Model Rules do not apply to a particular
arbitration unless they are accepted by the parties to the arbitration.' 29
The application of article 19 relative to counterclaims therefore seems to
122. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
123. Convention for the Establishment of an International Central American Tribunal,
Feb. 7, 1923 (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica), reprinted in
17 AM. J. INT'L. L. SUPP. 83 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Central American Convention].
124. Id. art. XIX(1). Article XIX, "Rules of Arbitral Procedure," provides by virtue of
its paragraph 1 for the incorporation of articles 63-84 of the 1907 Hague Convention, supra
note 118.
125. Central American Convention, supra note 123, at Annex B. The Rules of Proce-
dure referred to in paragraph 2 of Article XIX of the Convention for the Establishment of
an International Central American Tribunal, art. XIX, Id. at 98.
126. Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, 2 Y.B.INT'L L.COMM'N 83 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as U.N.M.R.A.PJ.
127. Id. at 85.
128. Paragraph 1, Preamble to U.N.M.R.A.P. Id. at 83.
129. Id.
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be dependent in the first instance on agreement between the parties to
accept the Model Rules as governing the arbitral proceedings. Even then,
when the Parties have agreed to the application of the Model Rules as a
whole, the applicability of article 19 may still be denied by virtue of a
special agreement between the Parties. Such a special agreement can be
implied or made explicit in and by the compromis.3 0 However, should
the Parties be silent as to the applicability of article 19, the Tribunal is
empowered to consider counterclaims. " 1
B. Counterclaims in Private International Arbitral Codes
Credit for the progressive development of rules pertaining to coun-
terclaims in international arbitration must go to international arbitral
codes whose purview is not restricted to disputes arising solely between
States. These instruments are ones under which at least one Party is a
non-State actor.
1. Permanent Court of International Arbitration's Rules of Arbi-
tration and Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes Be-
tween Two Parties of Which Only One is a State (1962)
Until 1935, the Permanent Court of International Arbitration (PCIA)
continued to lend its good offices for the settlement of disputes between
States, a role explicitly delegated to it by article 15 of the 1899 Hague
Convention and repeated in article 37 of the 1907 Hague Convention. ""
The Permanent Court of International Arbitration broke with this tradi-
tion in 1935. During an arbitration between the Chinese Government and
the Radio Corporation of America, the umpire, Professor von Hamel,
asked the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration to make available to the Tribunal the services of the
staff of the Permanent Court."" In circumventing the apparent intent of
article 15 of the 1899 Hague Convention and article 37 of the 1907 Hague
Convention, the Council and the International Bureau of the Permanent
Court accepted the umpire's request. They interpreted the provisions of
articles 26 and 47 of the 1899 and 1907 Conventions as authorizing the
Bureau to place its premises and staff at the disposal of the Contracting
130. Article 19 of the U.N.M.R.A.P. provides: "In the absence of any agreement to the
contrary implied by the undertaking to arbitrate or contained in the compromis, the tribu-
nal shall decide on any ancillary claims which it considers to be inseparable from the sub-
ject-matter of the dispute and necessary for its final settlement." See U.N.M.R.A.P., supra
note 126, at 85 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. See art. 15 of the 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 116; art. 37 of the 1907
Hague Convention, supra note 118. Article 37 of the 1907 Hague Convention, supra note
117, at 57 stipulates: "L'arbitrage international a pour objet le reglement de litiges entre les
Etats par les Juges de leur choix et sur Ia base du respect du droit."
133. Permanent Court of Abitration, Circular Note of the Secretary-General, March 3,
1960, reprinted in 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 933, 937 (1960) [hereinafter cited as P.C.A. Circular
Note].
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Powers for the use of any special arbitral board,'3 4 without stipulating
expressly that such services be rendered only in cases involving an arbi-
tration between States.185 While contrary to the apparent intent of the
1899 and 1907 Conventions, the decision must be applauded as an at-
tempt by the PCIA to keep pace with the nature and increasing number
of commercial arbitrations.
Several years later, the Permanent Court's International Bureau an-
nounced its readiness to place its premises and staff at the disposal of a
Contracting Power for the pacific settlement of international disputes,
even if one Party was not a State.' s5 In 1960, the PCIA took yet another
step forward in offering itself as a forum to which disputes between "a
private person or a foreign commercial corporation" and a sovereign State
may be referred without necessitating the espousal of the private party's
claim by its own State.1 3 7 The Secretary General of the Administrative
Council accordingly circulated a letter for consideration by the Con-
tracting Powers to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, stating the
Permanent Court's readiness to serve as a forum for the settlement of
disputes between a private party and a foreign State.'"
Subsequently, in February 1962, the Permanent Court's Interna-
tional Bureau published a set of Rules of Arbitration for the settlement of
international disputes between a private party and a foreign State.'3 ' Ar-
ticle 11 of the Rules relating to counterclaims stated that "[tihe respon-
dent may introduce a counterclaim against the claimant, provided that
this counterclaim be directly connected with the subject-matter of the re-
quest. The Tribunal, constituted in order to decide on the principal
claim, shall likewise decide on the counterclaim." 40 The application of
this provision is dependent in the first instance on the agreement (com-
promis) of the Parties to accept the Rules as governing the arbitral pro-
134. Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 118, at 67 (corresponding to
article 26 of the 1899 Hague Convention) provided, inter alia: "Le Bureau est autoris6 a
mettre ses locaux et son organisation a la disposition des Puissance Contractantes pour le
fonctionnement de toute jurisdiction speciale d'arbitrage."
135. See P.C.A. Circular Note, supra note 133, at 937.
136. In 1937, for example, the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration formally authorized the American Arbitration Association to publish the fact that
the Bureau was ready to place its premises and its staff at the disposal of the Contracting
Power for the pacific settlement of international disputes, even if one Party was not a State.
In turn, the American Arbitration Association informed its membership of the Bureau's de-
cision and recommended to the membership the text of an arbitral clause adopting this
approach, approved by the Bureau, to be inserted in the future in contracts with foreign
States. Id. at 937-38.
137. Id. at 937.
138. Id.
139. Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes be-
tween Two Parties of which only One is a State (Bureau International de la Cour
Permanente d'Arbitrage, February 1962), reprinted in 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 500 (1963) [herein-
after cited as P.C.A./RAC].
140. Id. at 503.
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ceedings. Even then, however, the parties are allowed to exempt the pro-
ceedings from the application of the rule relative to counterclaims. Article
10 of the Permanent Court's Rules clearly provides that any procedural
rule, including article 11 on counterclaims, applies only when there is an
absence of agreement of the parties to the contrary. 4' At any rate, under
the heading "procedure", article 11 of the Permanent Court's Rules rep-
resents the first attempt at the "codification" of an international law rule
of counterclaims in cases involving a private party and a foreign State.
2. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other States (1965)42
Article 46 of this Convention provides for the treatment of counter-
claims and states:
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested
by a party, determine only incidental or additional claims as counter-
claims arising directly out of the subject matter of the dispute pro-
vided that they are within the scope of the consent of the parties and
are otherwise within the jurisdiction of the [International Center for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes]."'
This provision was applied in Benvenuti et Bonfant S.R.L. v. Peo-
ples Republic of the Congo,14 4 where a panel of arbitrators under the aus-
pices of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes found that the Government of the Congo presented permissible
counterclaims. The claimant had entered into a joint venture agreement
with the Congolese Government in 1973 for the manufacture of plastic
bottles and the construction and operation of a mineral water bottling
plant. The equity shares were 40% and 60%, respectively. The claimant
later invoked the arbitration provision of its investment agreement,
claiming that the respondent Government had promulgated laws render-
ing the continued operation of the joint venture uneconomic and amount-
ing, in effect, to "creeping" expropriation. The respondent Government
counterclaimed, alleging (1) non-payment of import duties, (2) reporting
inflated raw materials costs, (3) defects in the construction of the manu-
facturing facility, (4) design faults in the facility and (5) "moral dam-
ages. 14 5 The tribunal held "that the counterclaim[s] relate[d] directly to
141. Article 10 of the P.C.A./RAC provides: "Unless agreed upon to the contrary by the
parties, the rules of procedure contained in the following articles shall be applicable." See
P.C.A./RAC, supra note 139, at 502.
142. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, entered into force October 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. No. 159 [hereinaf-
ter cited as ICSID Convention].
143. Id. at 188.
144. Benvenuti et Bonfant S.R.L. v. People's Republic of the Congo, International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Arbitration Tribunal, Award of Aug. 8,
1980, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 740 (1982).
145. Id. at paragraph 4.101, at 762-63.
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the subject matter of the dispute" and that they therefore were properly
within the jurisdiction of the panel.14 6
3. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976)
Issued in 1976, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law Arbitration Rules "" codifies the procedural permissibility of
counterclaims in international arbitrations. Article 19(3) provides:
In his statement of defence, or at a later stage in the arbitral proceed-
ings if the arbitral tribunal decides that the delay was justified under
the circumstances, the respondent may make a counter-claim arising
out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the same for
the purpose of a set-off. 148
Again, however, it should be observed that the counterclaim or set-off
contemplated is a rather narrow one.
4. Other International Arbitral Codes
In addition to the instruments enumerated above, it should also be
noted that there are a large number of conventions and codes that have
been promulgated by various international bodies concerned with the fur-
therance of international commercial arbitrations. It is not the focus of
this commentary to offer a survey of counterclaim rules set out in such
instruments,1 4 9 and therefore we refer to just two such instruments as ex-
amples. Article 5 of the Rules for the International Chamber of Com-
merce Court of Arbitration (1975) permits the defendant to make a coun-
terclaim.15 0 Similarly, article 26 of the Uniform Rules of Procedure in the
Arbitration Courts at the Chamber of Commerce of the Council of Mu-
tual Economic Assistance Countries " provides for the submission of
counterclaims by the respondent.1 5 2
C. Summary
It can be seen that based on both treaty and the practice of interna-
146. Id. at paragraph 4.101, p. 763.
147. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) [issued at the 9th session of the Commission's work on 12 April-7 May, 1976,
Doc. No. A/31/17], reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, (C. Schmitthoff
ed. 1975).
148. Id.
149. For an excellent anthology of documents pertaining to international arbitrations,
see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 147. This source is periodically
updated to reflect developments in the field.
150. Rules for the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, in force
as of June 1, 1975. Reprinted in id., part IV, D8.
151. Id.
152. The Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Arbitration Courts at the Chambers of
Commerce of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance Countries, done in Moscow, Feb.
26, 1974. Reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 147 at 250.
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tional arbitral tribunals (and acquiesced in by States), counterclaims,
where not prohibited, are permissible. Where counterclaims are left un-
mentioned in arbitral agreements, they are allowed by tribunals as a mat-
ter of general international jurisprudence.
V. SUBSTANCE OF COUNTERCLAIM RULES
In the previous sections of this commentary, the emergence, progres-
sive development and ultimate acceptance under international law of
counterclaims in international arbitration was outlined. While these pre-
ceding sections dealt primarily with the procedural admissibility of coun-
terclaims, the present discussion will focus on the substantive rules gov-
erning counterclaims in international arbitration. Specifically, three areas
will be explored: (1) the development of the "relatedness" criterion; (2)
the fate of counterclaims in the event of dismissal, procedurally or on the
merits, of a claim; and (3) the rule governing counterclaims in excess of
the original claim itself.
A. The Relatedness Criterion
Several general principles of international law relating to counter-
claims emerge from the conventions, rules of procedure and decisions of
international courts and arbitral tribunals. First, in the realm of interna-
tional adjudication between States, counterclaims are permitted insofar
as they relate to the subject of the original claim or come within the juris-
diction of the Court. This conclusion is based on both international con-
ventions'5 and case law, as acquiesced in by States.1 5 4
Second, in the area of international arbitration, in disputes between
States or a State and a private party, tribunals permit counterclaims re-
lated to the original claim, unless the parties agree to the contrary in the
compromis. This is illustrated by the model rules for international arbi-
tration, 55 various conventions, " 0 the compromis' 7 and the discretionary
practice of international arbitral tribunals. 5
153. See, e.g., art. 296 of the Treaty of Versailles, supra note 69, which the tribunal
found dispositive in the case of counterclaims unrelated to the original claim in The
Vandyck Printers Ltd. v. Modeaner Kunst-Belag G.m.b.H. (Great Britain v. Germany), 6
Trib. Arb. Mixtes 33 (1926-1927). See also art. 63 of the 1936 Rules of the Permanent Court
of International Justice, supra note 24, and art. 63 of the Rules of the International Court of
Justice, set forth in supra note 26.
154. See, e.g., Chorzow Factory Case, (Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 17
at 38 (Judgment of Sept. 13, 1928).
155. See, e.g., article 19, U.N.M.R.A.P., supra note 126.
156. See, e.g., art. 11, P.C.A./RAC, supra note 139; art. 46, ICSID Convention, supra
note 142; Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 101.
157. See, e.g., art. 2(1), Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 102.
158. See, e.g., South African Republican v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de
Fer du Nord, [1898] L. R. Ch. 190; The Carthage Case, (France v. Italy), Permanent Court
of Arbitration, Award of May 6, 1913, reprinted in J. B. Scorr, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS
330 (2d. Ser. 1916); The Manouba Case, (France v. Italy), Permanent Court of Arbitration,
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Third, despite the various contexts in which counterclaim provisions
have been formulated, arbitral tribunals have interpreted the related-to-
the-original-claim criterion with remarkable unanimity, basing their posi-
tion invariably on the compromis which established each tribunal. 5 9
Finally, in international arbitration, a procedurally correct counter-
claim, that is, one which is deemed by the tribunal to be related to the
original claim or which comes within its jurisdiction, is permitted regard-
less of the status of the party originating the counterclaim. The counter-
claim may originate from (1) a private party counter-claimant against a
private party claimant;' 60 (2) a private party counter-claimant against a
claimant State; 6 ' (3) a counter-claimant State against a private party
claimant; 2 or (4) a counter-claimant State against a claimant State.1 63
This symmetry relating to the limits placed upon the counterclaim arises
from the presumption that the parties are considered by the tribunal to
be equal before it and the law,' 64 and that injustice would result if coun-
terclaims were not to be considered as potentially admissible.
Thus, there exist general rules of international law governing coun-
terclaims in international judicial and arbitral proceedings. These rules
provide that a counterclaim is permissible only when it arises out of the
same subject matter as that involved in the principal claim.
Award of May 6, 1912, reprinted in J. B. ScoTT, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 330 (2d. Ser.
1916); The Empire Transport Co., Ltd. v. Bd. Blumenfeld (Great Britain v. Germany), 4
Trib. Arb. Mixtes 205 (1924-1925); The Beeley Wood Steel Co., Ltd. v. Franz & Massmann
(Great Britain v. Germany), 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 289 (1928-1929).
159. See cases cited in supra note 158.
160. See, e.g., The Empire Transport Co., Ltd. v. Bd. Blumenfeld (Great Britain v.
Germany), 4 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 205 (1924-1925); Nitrogen Fertilizers Ltd. v. Verkaufe Verei-
ningung fuer Stickstoffsdunger G.m.b.H. (Great Britain v. Germany), 5 Trib. Arb. Mixtes
648 (1926); The Beeley Wood Steel Co. Ltd. v. Franz & Massmann (Great Britain v. Ger-
many), 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 289 (1928-1929) Morgan & Co. v. W.H. Chaplin & Co. Ltd.
(Great Britain v. Germany), 6 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 43 (1926-1927). See also, T.C.S.B., Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140, Chamber 2, at 23-24.
161. See, e.g., The Empire Transport Co., Ltd., 4 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 205; Nitrogen Fer-
tilizers Ltd., 5 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 648; Morgan & Co., 6 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 43; The Beeley
Wood Steel Co. Ltd.; 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 289.
162. See, e.g., South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de
Fer du Nord, supra note 52.
163. See, e.g., Ernest Epstein v. German Government (Great Britain v. Germany), 6
Trib. Arb. Mixtes 19 (1926-1927); Benvenuti et Bonfant v. People's Republic of the Congo,
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Arbitration Tribunal,
Award of Aug. 8, 1980, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 740 (1982); T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140, Chamber 2, at 23-24; American Bell International,
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, June 11, 1984, Case No. 48, Chamber 3, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS
Tam. REP. (1984).
164 See, e.g., Charles Duke of Brunswick v. The King of Hanover, 6 Bevan 1, 37, 38
[1844]; The Carthage Case (France v. Italy), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award of May
6, 1913, reprinted in J. B. Scott, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 330 (2d. ser. 1916); The Ma-
nouba Case (France v. Italy), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award of May 6, 1912, re-
printed in J. B. Scort, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 330 (2d. ser. 1916).
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B. Dismissed Claims and Counterclaims
The basic question raised here is: What procedure, if any, is available
to the counterclaiming party to pursue a counterclaim which has been
disallowed by the arbitral tribunal on the ground of not relating to the
original claim or not coming within the jurisdiction of the tribunal? Inso-
far as the procedure of the World Court is concerned, the prosecution of a
dismissed counterclaim in international adjudication is straightforward,
and is effected by means of an application to the Court for a new action.
Article 63 of the 1936 Rules of the PCIJ'65 and articles 63 of the 1946 and
80 of the 1978 Rules of the International Court of Justice s6 provide that
a State's dismissed counterclaim may form the subject-matter of a sepa-
rate application (claim). In both cases, the Court reserved the right to
treat the counterclaim separately or to join it to the original proceed-
ings.'6 7 Although procedurally permissible, no case before the World
Court has been discovered where a respondent State has undertaken to
institute a separate application containing the subject matter of an al-
ready dismissed counterclaim.
In the realm of international arbitration, however, the rules gov-
erning counterclaims are silent as to the future of a dismissed or imper-
missible counterclaim.I' s An interesting permutation arose in T.C.S.B.,'69
where the plaintiff's fourth claim against the Government of Iran was dis-
missed. Iran nevertheless pressed a related counterclaim. The compromis
was silent on the issue of whether a counterclaim may exist indepen-
dently of the original claim. The Tribunal held that since it had dis-
missed the claim, the counterclaim "must also be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction."' 70
The T.C.S.B. panel did not indicate which rule of international law it
applied in dismissing the counterclaim related to the original claim. It
appears that the panel construed its own jurisdiction and power to deter-
mine what the pertinent rule of international law is or should be. The
rule "no claim, therefore no counterclaim" is one which may prove to be
an invaluable tactical weapon in the hands of a claimant faced with the
prospects of a troublesome counterclaim.
165. See supra note 24.
166. See supra notes 26, 30.
167. Id. See supra notes 24, 26, 30.
168. See, e.g., U.N.M.R.A.P., supra note 126; P.C.A./RAC, supra note 139; ICSID Con-
vention, supra note 142.
169. T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140, Chamber
2, at 23-24.
170. Id. at 24. The Tribunal stated: "The [respondent] has . . . counterclaimed for
damages arising from TCSB's alleged failure to perform its contractual obligations under
the. . . contract. Since the Full Tribunal has dismissed the claimant's claim based on the
... contract .... the counterclaim . . .must also be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."
Id. Accord Reliance Group Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Iran-U.S. Claims Trib., decision
of Dec. 9, 1982, Case No. 90, Chamber 2, 1 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. 284, 285 (Award)
(1983).
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The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal recently was presented with a request
by Continental Illinois National Bank to withdraw its claim against Iran,
thereby depriving the Tribunal of jurisdiction to entertain Iran's counter-
claims, which had not as yet been filed by the defendant.1 71 As of the time
of this writing, the Tribunal had not rendered a decision with respect to
the plaintiff's request and the fate of Iran's counterclaims.
C. Counterclaims in Excess of the Original Claim
One difficult problem in the international law governing counter-
claims is whether an otherwise permissible counterclaim may exceed the
amount of the original claim. There is no doubt that a counterclaim may
be less than or equal to the amount awarded for the original claim,'
7 2
barring any provision of the compromis to the contrary. However, the sit-
uation where the counterclaim exceeds the original claim is analagous to
the case where the original claim is dismissed or withdrawn; 17 3 that is, the
original claim is legally "wiped out" by virtue of the award for the coun-
terclaim and the excess of the counterclaim has an independent legal ex-
istence. There is a paucity of cases and literature on this issue.1'7 There
appears to be no international judicial or arbitral case where the forum
has granted an award for a counterclaim exceeding the claim itself. The
issue was raised recently, however, in American Bell International.7 5
As discussed above, American Bell brought a $63.8 million claim
before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal for its services, equipment and
other expenses arising out of the performance of two contracts in Iran.
Iran filed seven counterclaims exceeding $285 million against the plaintiff
and its parent, American Telephone & Telegraph, for a variety of alleged
contractual breaches and violations of Iranian law. The Tribunal held in
an interlocutory award that Iran could not counterclaim against AT&T
but that it could counterclaim against ABI, AT&T's successor in interest,
171. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Case No. 252, Chamber 3, Order of Oct. 21, 1982, 1 IRAN-U.S.
CLAIMS Tim. REP. 232 (1983). For a discussion of the international rules governing the with-
drawal of a claim where a counterclaim has not been filed. See id. (dissenting opinion of
Judge Mosk, at 232-233).
172. See Dickinson, Waiver of State Immunity, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 555, 556
(1925) and sources cited therein.
173. This is not a settled area of international law. For instance, in Gould Marketing,
Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense of Iran, decision of July 27, 1983, Case No. 49, Cham-
ber 2, 3 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tuis. Rap. 147 (interlocutory award) (1984), the claimant objected
to the Ministry of Defense's $40 million counterclaim, which was far in excess of its $5
million original claim, as an affirmative award against it, in violation of the Claims Settle-
ment Declaration supra note 101. 3 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TIaB. REP. at 151. The Tribunal re-
jected this theory stating that there is "no support for [the claimant's contention that the
jurisdictional bar on direct claims comprehends a bar on affirmative counterclaims." Id. at
152. For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 177-185 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
175. American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran, June 11, 1984, Case No.
48, Chamber 3, 3 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tais. REP. (1984).
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for breach of contract.' 7 No decision has yet been made on the merits of
Iran's counterclaims or on the procedural admissibility of the $221.1 mil-
lion excess between the original claim and the counterclaim.
Similarly, in Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National De-
fense,'1 7 a claim was filed for $5 million relating to various alleged
breaches of contract for the delivery and maintenance of radio equip-
ment. The Defense Ministry filed a counterclaim for over $40 million. s7 8
The claimant objected "to the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the counter-
claim to the extent it sought relief in excess of the amount claimed on the
theory that the Tribunal lacks power to issue affirmative awards against
United States nationals."' 79 The Tribunal rejected the claimant's objec-
tion to subject matter jurisdiction in an interlocutory award as the claim
fell "within the requirements" of article 2(1) of the Declaration of Algiers,
"even if it exceeds the amount of the claim."' 0
In the final award, the Tribunal dismissed the counterclaims on the
merits.'8 ' In an unexpected move, however, the Tribunal ordered the
claimant to pay $3.6 million to the Defense Ministry. The award was for
repayment of sums paid in advance under the contracts but never per-
formed by the claimant. The Tribunal applied California law (as specified
in the contracts) "to equitably allocate" the costs of the contract as far as
it was performed."8 2 The Tribunal applied equitable principles as a mat-
ter of American municipal law to make an affirmative award in favor of
Iran while dismissing counterclaims which amounted to separate claims.
Thus, the award did not involve the issue of counterclaims in excess of
the original claim.
This holding at first seems to cast doubt on the proposition that arbi-
tral tribunals do not grant awards on counterclaims in excess of the origi-
nal claim. There are two distinctions, however, which may serve to ex-
plain the Tribunal's actions. First, the claimant may have made a tactical
error by characterizing the amount of the counterclaim in excess of the
original claim as an "affirmative award. . . against United States nation-
als" 183 and, therefore, outside of the Tribunal's jurisdiction.'" The Tribu-
176. Id. at 17.
177. Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense, Case No. 49, Chamber 2, 3
IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. 147.
178. Id. at 151-52.
179. Id. at 151. Under the construction given to art. 2(1) of the Claims Settlement Dec-
laration in the Case Concerning the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal with Respect to Claims by
the Islamic Republic of Iran Against Nationals of the United States of America, supra note
102, the Tribunal held that it has "no jurisdiction over claims" filed by the Government of
Iran against nationals of the United States. IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tam. REP. at 101. Thus, Iran
may appear only as a respondent before the Tribunal.
180. 3 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS ThIs. REP. at 151.
181. Id. at 151.
182. Id.
183. See supra note 173.
184. 3 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. at 152.
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nal correctly observed in response that its jurisdiction rests on article 2(1)
of the Declaration of Algiers, as the "counterclaims arise directly out of
the contract which constitutes the subject matter of [the] claim. '" 5 Per-
haps the better approach would have been to focus on the claim and to
argue that the original claim ceases to exist under international law once
the counterclaim exceeds the original claim. Thus, under the reasoning of
the Tribunal's holding in T.C.S.B.,' 6e without a claim there can be no
counterclaim.
The second alternative is for the Tribunal to consider the merits of
the counterclaim, but to restrict any award on the counterclaim to the
actual award, if any, made on the original claim. This would be a practi-
cal approach and yet one which adheres to the principle of no counter-
claim in excess of the original claim. Because of the unsettled nature of
the issue, however, analogy to municipal legal principles may be helpful.
VI. U.S. LAW AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF ANALOGY
Limited discussion of the legal status of counterclaims which exceed
the amount of the original claim can be found in United States municipal
law. s1 8 However, international tribunals may be able to draw the neces-
sary legal principles from municipal law which can be applied by analogy
in the international context. It is not uncommon for international tribu-
nals to look to municipal law for a legal principle which might be incorpo-
rated into the proceedings of an international dispute. For instance, in
The Island of Palmas Case,188 between the United States and The
Netherlands, the sole arbitrator referred to the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States to sustain the view that prescription founded
on length of time constitutes a valid and incontestable title to territory.
1 8 9
The analogy to municipal law, however, should be undertaken with
some care. In the Case of the S.S. "Lotus,"""0 the Permanent Court of
International Justice observed that "the courts of many countries" 9 ' al-
lowed limited extraterritorial application of municipal criminal law. In
185. Id.
186. See T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140,
Chamber 2, at 23-24.
187. In American judicial practice the issue of counterclaims in excess of the original
claim repeatedly has been held to limit the amount of the counterclaim up to the amount of
the original claim. See infra notes 247-258 and accompanying text.
188. The Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. The Netherlands), Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration, Award of April 4, 1928, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 831.
189. Id. at 840. The arbitrator observed: It may suffice to quote among several non-
dissimilar decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America that in the case
of the State of Indiana v. State of Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479 (1890), where the precedent of
the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 45 U.S. [4 How.] 591, 639 (1846), is supported by
quotations from Vattel and Wheaton, who both admitted prescriptions founded on length of
time as a valid and incontestable title. Id.
190. [1927] P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No. 9/10 (France v. Turkey).
191. Id. at 23.
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that case, both France and Turkey cited numerous municipal court deci-
sions to support conflicting legal principles on the extraterritorial exten-
sion of municipal criminal law. The Court concluded that "[w]ithout
pausing to consider the value to be attributed to the judgments of munic-
ipal courts in connection with the establishment of the existence of a rule
of international law, it will suffice to observe that the decisions quoted
sometimes support one view and sometimes the other. '" ' Thus, reference
by an international court or arbitral tribunal to a municipal law analogy
should be in an area where there is general agreement.
This would seem to have been the case in the Trail Smelter Arbitra-
tion,' s between the United States and Canada, that involved large
amounts of pollutants crossing the border between Canada and the
United States and despoiling certain farms in the state of Washington.
The arbitrators referred, inter alia, to the decision of the United States
Supreme Court on the issue of interstate riparian pollution in order to
ascertain a general principle of law applicable by analogy to cases involv-
ing international air pollution. 94
A. The Relatedness Criterion
The rule in the United States federal courts and in most states
within the United States" is that a defendant may assert a counterclaim
if it arises out of the same contract from which the plaintiff's rights
flow."e6 This approach was adopted in section 9-318 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) and has received wide acceptance in the U.S."97 The
UCC provides that the plaintiff's rights are subject to a counterclaim if
the subject matter of the counterclaim arises from the original claim be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant."8s The UCC bars counterclaims ex-
192. Id. at 28.
193. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), Canada-United State Trail Smelter Arb.
Trib., decision of 1941, reprinted in 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1938.
194. Id. at 1963-65. Among the cases cited with approval by the Tribunal were Kansas
v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Georgia v. Ten-
nessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1906); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. and Ducktown
Sulphur, Cooper and Iron Co., Ltd., 237 U.S. 474 (1915); New York v. New Jersey and Paaic
Valley Sewerage Commissioners, 256 U.S. 296 (1921).
195. The right to counterclaim is based on statute and varies by jurisdiction. S. WILLIS-
TON & G. THOMPSON, SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON'S TREATISES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
432 (Rev. ed. 1938) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
196. 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, at 896. Cf. Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(permitting liberal joinder of counterclaims).
197. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 18-19 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CALAMARI & PERILLO].
198. See Uniform Commercial Code § 9-318. See also, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS,
which provides:
§ 336. Defenses Against an Assignee.
(1) By an assignment the assignee acquired a right against the obligor only to
the extent that the obligor is under a duty to the assignor;
(2) The right of an assignee is subject to any defense or claim of the obligor
which accrues before the obligor receives notification of the assignment, but
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ceeding the damages awarded in the original claim.' 99 With regard to
claims involving a foreign sovereign, 00 U.S. federal case law allows a
plaintiff to press a claim on its merits while barring a foreign respondent
Government from maintaining a counterclaim unrelated to the appli-
cant's claim, and barring an American defendant from raising counter-
claims unrelated to the applicant-Government's claim.20
1
The modern American municipal position can be traced to three
British cases which established the principle that only counterclaims
stemming from the "same transaction" may be asserted against a foreign
sovereign plaintiff.20 2 In High Commissioner for India v. Gosh, °3 the In-
dian High Commissioner and the Indian Government brought suit to col-
lect a debt. The defendant counterclaimed for damages stemming from
an alleged slander. The British court held that by bringing the suit on the
debt the plaintiffs had submitted to the court's jurisdiction only on this
action, including any reasonable counterclaim connected to the claim. It
dismissed the counterclaim 201 on the ground that it was unrelated to the
not to defenses or claims which accrue thereafter.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1981).
199. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 197, at 17-18. Further, the award for counter-
claims may not exceed the judgment granted for the original claim. See, e.g., Republic of
China v. Pang-Tsu Mow, 105 F. Supp. 411 (D.D.C. 1952); Hungarian People's Republic v.
Cecil Associates, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (discussed infra at notes 252-253).
200. The issue of sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine have become hope-
lessly interwined with the American municipal law rules governing counterclaims. See gen-
erally Looper, Counterclaims Against a Foreign Sovereign Plaintiff, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 647
(1956). This was evident in National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361
(1955), discussed infra at notes 213-216, where the Court stated:
The short of the matter is that we are not dealing with an attempt to bring a
recognized foreign government into one of our courts as a defendant and sub-
ject it to the rule of law to which a non-governmental obligor must bow. We
have a foreign government invoking our law but resisting a claim against it
which fairly would curtail its recovery .... It becomes vital, therefore, to ex-
amine the extent to which considerations which led this court to bar a suit
against a sovereign in The Schooner Exchange are applicable here to foreclose
a court from determining. . .whether the Republic of China's claim against the
National City Bank would be unjustly enforced by disregarding legitimate
claims against the Republic of China.
Id. at 361-62. This rule was recently restated in First National City Bank v. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 459 U.S. 942, 103 S. Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed.2d 198 (1983). See also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at 70.
201. See, e.g., Looper, supra note 200.
202. See generally Strousberg v. Republic of Costa Rica, 44 L.T.R. (N.S.) 199 (C.A.
1881); South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge de Chemin de Fer du Nord,
[18981 1 Ch. 190, discussed supra at notes 37-39; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v.
Belaiew, 42 T.L.R. 21 (K.B. Div. 1925). See also Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 6
Beav. 68, discussed supra at notes 54-55. For an early American formulation of the rule
regarding counterclaims, see Justice Washington's circuit opinion in King of Spain v. Oliver,
14 F. Cas. 572 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 78130).
203. [19591 3 All. E.R. 659; 3 W.L.R. 811.
204. Id.
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original claim. 0 5
It appears that the reciprocal rule, that a foreign State respondent
may bring a counterclaim relating to the original claim or transaction
against a private party plaintiff, seems to have emerged as a matter of
equity.206 The rule governing counterclaims against a foreign sovereign
claimant was expressed in article 5 of the Harvard Research on the Com-
petence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 2o which provides that:
"[a] complainant State, by instituting a proceeding in a court of another
State, submits to the jurisdiction of that court in respect of a direct coun-
terclaim . . .arising out of the facts or transactions upon which a com-
plainant's claim is based."20 8
The trend in U.S. municipal courts has been to broaden slightly the
"same transaction" rule of the older British cases into the modern "same
claim" rule.209 This change appears to have resulted from the growing
complexity of international business transactions and a recognition that
equity would not be served by narrowly interpreting permissible counter-
claims. This trend towards liberalization was evident in United States v.
National City Bank of New York, 1 in which the federal Government, as
assignee of the Soviet Government under the Litvinov Assignment,
brought suit for funds held by National City Bank.2" The respondent
bank counterclaimed for delinquent Russian Government treasury notes.
The Second Circuit found for the bank, stating that the same transaction
could include an ongoing course of dealings related to the subject matter
of the claim.2 2
This trend in the federal courts peaked in 1955 with the Supreme
Court's decision in National City Bank of New York v. Republic of
China.1 13 This case involved a claim for $200,000 held on account in New
York for the Shanghai-Nanking Railway Administration, an agency of the
205. Id.
206. This appears to be the practice in federal courts, despite the permissiveness of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(b).
207. Harvard Research, supra note 27, at 451.
208. Id. at 508.
209. Looper, supra note 200, at 649; see also the cases cited in supra note 202.
210. 83 F. 2d 236, 237 (2d Cir. 1936).
211. The funds, amounting to $115,000, were deposited in December 1917 with Bank-
ers Trust Co. of New York. A dispute arose as to the proper payee of the funds. To protect
itself, Bankers Trust deposited the funds with National City Bank. The Russian Govern-
ment brought suit in 1925 to compel the release of the funds then held by National City
Bank. National City Bank counterclaimed for certain defaulted Russian treasury notes. The
district court allowed the counterclaim and the bank prevailed. The Russian Government
appealed but, before the case was decided, the United States Government became the as-
signee of the claim on November 16, 1933 under the Litvinov Assignment. The federal gov-
ernment then brought suit against National City Bank. Id. at 237.
212. The court stated that "[c]laims arising out of the same transaction may be set-off
against the sovereign. The same transaction does not necessarily mean occurring at the same
time." 83 F.2d at 239.
213. 108 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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Chinese Government. National City Bank counterclaimed for $1.6 million
on the claimant's defaulted treasury notes. The district court, applying
the "same transaction" standard, dismissed the counterclaims because
they were not based on the subject matter of the suit.2"4 The Second Cir-
cuit affirmed, 21 ' although the bank indicated its willingness to use the
counterclaims only to the extent of the judgment awarded to the respon-
dent and to not seek affirmative relief. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "the limitation of 'based on the subject matter' is too inde-
terminate, indeed too capricious, to mark the bounds of the
limitations. 21
6
Similarly, the Banco Nacional de Cuba v. The First National City
Bank of New York case2 1 1 may be said to have broadened the criterion as
to what constitutes a counterclaim related to the original claim. Initially,
an action was brought by Banco Nacional de Cuba, the financial agency
of the Cuban Government, to recover funds held by the First National
City Bank of New York (Citibank), comprising $1,810,880.51. This sum
represented the excess realized on the sale of certain collateral held by
Citibank as security for a loan to a corporation owned by the Cuban Gov-
ernment. Also involved was $33,812.93 in accounts maintained by Cuban
banks at Citibank. The defendant filed a counterclaim to set-off against
the proceeds an amount up to the value of its Cuban properties expropri-
ated by the Cuban Government.
The plaintiff sought to bar the defendant's counterclaim by invoking
the doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state. The district court
dismissed the plaintiff's defense against the counterclaim. Judge Bryan
reasoned that Citibank was entitled to set-off against the plaintiff's claim
and to recover the excess funds as compensation for the seized Citibank
branches in Cuba.2 1 8
The Second Circuit reversed,21 9 with Chief Judge Lumbard observing
that by its counterclaim, Citibank was seeking in effect "something more"
214. Id. at 767.
215. Republic of China et.al. v. National City Bank of New York, 208 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir. 1953).
216. National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. at 364. The Court
continued:
There is great diversity among courts on what is and what is not a claim
"based on the subject matter of the suit" or "growing out of the same transac-
tion." No doubt the present counterclaims cannot fairly be deemend to be re-
lated to the Railway Agency's deposit of funds except insofar as the transac-
tions between the Republic of China and the petitioner may be regarded as
aspects of a continuous business relationship. The point is that the ultimate
thrust of the consideration of fair dealing which allows a setoff or counterclaim
based on the same subject matter reaches the present situation.
Id. at 364-65.
217. 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
218. Id.
219. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. The First National City Bank of New York, 431 F.2d
394 (2d. Cir. 1970).
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than just a dollar-for-dollar relief on the loan transaction.2 2 The court
held that Citibank should not have been allowed to recover on its coun-
terclaim for its expropriated Cuban properties. 2 ' On appeal, the Supreme
Court remanded the case without opinion for consideration in light of a
brief filed by the Department of State.2 2 On remand, the Second Circuit
affirmed its original decision.2 2 3
The State Department intervention, known as the Stevenson letter,
stated inter alia that (1) the act of state doctrine need not be applied
when it is raised to bar adjudication of a counterclaim or set-off, and (2)
the amount of relief sought is limited to the amount of the foreign State's
claim.224 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit declined to find in Citibank's
favor by allowing it to set-off Banco Nacional's claim against its confis-
cated Cuban properties. 2 5
Citibank again appealed and this time the Supreme Court reversed
the Second Circuit.2 6 Justice Douglas' concurring opinion illustrates the
liberal interpretation accorded the "same transaction" rule. He observed
that:
[i]t would also offend our sensibilities if Cuba could collect the amount
owed on liquidation of the collateral for the loan and not be required to
account for any setoff. To allow recovery without more would permit
Cuba to have her cake and eat it too. Fair dealing requires allowance of
the setoff to the amount of the claim on which this suit is brought.22
Some commentators have lauded Republic of China2 2 8 as sounding
the death knell for a narrow interpretation of the "same transaction" rule
and signaling the shift to a broader "same claim" standard . 2 9 Looper ar-
gues that Republic of China eliminated the principle that counterclaims
in federal courts must be tied to the original claim.8 0 In one of the Cuban
Cigar cases,2 1 the Second Circuit observed that, "[t]he counterclaim
220. 431 F.2d 394, 404 (2d. Cir. 1970).
221. Id.
222. 400 U.S. at 1019.
223. 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
224. Id. at 536. The "Stevenson Letter" stipulated, inter alia, that "the act of state
doctrine need not be applied when it is raised to bar adjudication of a counter claim or set-
off," and that the amount of relief to be granted is limited to the amount of the foreign
state's claim." For the full text of the "Stevenson Letter," see 10 I.L.M. 89 (1971).
225. Id. at 533-34.
226. First National City Bank of New York v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1971).
227. Id. at 772.
228. 348 U.S. 356.
229. See, e.g., Looper, supra note 200.
230. Id. at 650-51.
231. On September 15th,. 1960 the Cuban Government expropriated the business and
assets of the five leading manufacturers of high grade Havana cigars and placed interventors
in charge of these enterprises. The interventors, acting on behalf of the Cuban Government,
continued to manufacture and export the cigars to the U.S. under trademarks belonging to
the confiscated firms. The three importers (Faber, Coe, & Gregg; Alfred Dunhill of London;
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here, unlike that in First National City Bank, arises out of a course of
dealing with respect to the same parties or their successors. Indeed, the
equities here balance much more heavily in favor of the importers than in
the First National City Bank case where the counterclaim arose out of a
wholly unrelated factual context."2 ' It is thus evident that federal courts
may abandon the "same transaction" rule in favor of a somewhat broader
"same claim" standard when equity is perceived as requiring it. Looper's
criticism, however, cannot stand in the light of this interpretation. Re-
public of China and its progeny stand for nothing more than a recogni-
tion that international business transactions are complicated (both by
their nature and the politics which are inevitably involved), and that eq-
uity requires that federal courts examine the context in which claims and
counterclaims arise." 3' This was recently demonstrated by the Second
Circuit in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank.2 3 4 Banco
Nacional brought suit to recover $9,794,000 from Chase Manhattan for
funds on deposit with Chase as collateral at the time of the Cuban revolu-
tion.' 35 Chase Manhattan did not dispute the validity of Banco Nacional's
claims. Rather, Chase asserted two sets of counterclaims: first, in its own
right, the bank sought damages for the expropriation of its four Cuban
branches and, second, as trustee for certain U.S. railroad interests, whose
leased equipment was nationalized.2 36 The court held that Chase could
maintain its first set of counterclaims because they were closely enough
and Saks & Co.) accepted and retained the cigars shipped by the interventors but did not
pay the interventors for most of the cigars received after September 15th. The majority of
shareholders of the five firms had fled to the United States. They initiated nine actions in
the U.S. district court against the various importers seeking (1) to enjoin the defendants
from infringing plaintiffs' U.S. trademarks or paying anyone for products so marked; (2) to
obtain an accounting, damages and any money found to be owing to plaintiffs; and (3) to
recover the purchase price of cigars bearing trademarks shipped from their factories in
Cuba. Upon commencement of the actions, the interventors brought an action to enjoin
prosecution of the actions and to substitute the interventors' counsel for the original plain-
tiffs' counsel. Thus began a prolonged three-way battle between the owners, interventors
and importers. Among the many issues raised in the Cuban Cigar Cases was the question of
counterclaims and set-offs relative to monies paid by the parties for pre- and post-interven-
tion shipments. See F. Palacio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Menendez v. Saks
& Co., 485 F.2d. 1355 (2d Cir. 1973); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96
S.Ct. (1976).
232. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1373-74.
233. See supra note 216.
234. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
235. Id. at 879.
236. Banco Nacional argued that the act of state doctrine barred the court from adjudi-
cating the courterclaim. The district court held that under First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1971), the act of state doctrine did not bar the
counterclaim. See also National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, where the
Court ruled that when a foreign sovereign asserts a claim in a U.S. court, "the consideration
of fair dealing" bars the state from asserting a defense of sovereign immunity to defeat a
setoff or counterclaim. Id. at 365. This was recently reaffirmed in First National City Bank
v. Banco Para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
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related to the plaintiff's original claim in that they arose out of Chase's
course of dealings with Banco Nacional. Chase was barred from asserting
the second set of counterclaims as trustee. The court noted that "a de-
fendant may counterclaim only in the capacity in which he has been
sued. 2 37 Since the counterclaims on behalf of the railroad interests were
presented by the bank as trustee, they rightfully were rejected as inde-
pendent claims.2 38
A similar result was reached in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical
Bank New York Trust Co. 23 9 Banco Nacional brought suit to recover cer-
tain sums it had deposited with Chemical Bank in New York. Banco Na-
cional also sought to recover sums deposited by private Cuban banks with
the Chemical Bank, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and Irving Trust
Co.; Banco Nacional claimed to be the successor in interest to the private
banks, which were nationalized by the Cuban Government.
The defendant banks counterclaimed on the ground that the Cuban
Electric Company, a Florida corporation nationalized by the Cuban Gov-
ernment in 1960, owed them sums in excess of Banco Nacional's claims
and for which it stood liable as the Cuban Government's alter ego.
The Second Circuit remanded the case for a determination of the
justiciability of the counterclaims. It indicated, however, that it would bar
the counterclaims against Banco Nacional for the sum deposited with
Chemical Bank in its own name as Banco Nacional was shown not to have
played a role in the nationalization of Cuban Electric.4 0 The court found,
however, that since Banco Nacional represented the Cuban Government,
which owned the funds on deposit from the now-nationalized Cuban
banks, the counterclaims would be allowed.241
The rule emerging from the practice of federal courts with respect to
assignees is that counterclaims will be allowed only if they relate to the
original claim. The equitable shift away from the "same transaction"
standard to a broader "same claim" rule should not be overly empha-
sized. The "same transaction" standard has withstood the test of time,
while the "same claim" rule is invoked only when equity knocks at the
court's door.
237. 658 F.2d at 886.
238. Id. The Court also took the opportunity to formulate a "phenomenological rule"
to determine whether claims should be barred by the act of state doctrine:
[W]here (1) the Executive Branch has provided a Bernstein letter advising the
courts that it believe [sic] act of state doctrine need not be applied, (2) there is
no showing that an adjudication of the claim will interfere with delicate foreign
relations, and (3) the claim against the foreign sovereign is asserted by way of
counterclaim and does not exceed the value of the sovereign's claim, adjudica-
tion of the counterclaim for expropriation of the defendant's property is not
barred by the act of state doctrine.
Id. at 884. Thus, Chase was permitted to maintain its first set of counterclaims.
239. 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981).
240. Id. at 910.
241. Id. at 910-11.
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B. Counterclaims Without an Original Claim
As noted in the discussion above of T.C.S.B., the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal dismissed Iran's related counterclaim for want of jurisdiction
because the panel had dismissed the plaintiff's original claim.242 This po-
sition is in accord with federal law, which holds that without a claim
there can be no counterclaim.24 3 In First National Bank of Boston (Inter-
national) v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,2 4 4 the Second Circuit -allowed the
respondent Banco Nacional to maintain a counterclaim against an as-
signee based on a right of action against the assignor. Boston's wholly-
owned subsidiary, BBI, was Boston's assignee and successor in interest.2"
On appeal, BBI's claims were dismissed; nevertheless, Banco Nacional at-
tempted to pursue its counterclaim. The court held that since no claims
were allowed, the counterclaims must be dismissed.2 "
C. Counterclaims in Excess of the Original Claim
As discussed earlier in American Bell International,247 the U.S.-Iran
Claims Tribunal was confronted with seven counterclaims by Iran which
exceeded by some $122 million the amount of the original claim. An inter-
locutory award has been made in the case;2 "1 however, no decision has
been reached as to the permissibility of the counterclaims, including the
issue of whether a counterclaim in excess of the original claim would be
allowed. The rule in federal courts is that the amount of the counterclaim
against a State by a private party may not exceed the original claim or
the judgment awarded on the original claim.2 4 9 If the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal follows precedent based on U.S. law, it should refuse to permit
Iran's counterclaim insofar as it exceeds ABI's original claim.
In Republic of China v. Pang-Tsu Mow,2 50 the respondent filed coun-
terclaims in excess of the Chinese Government's original claim. The dis-
trict court held that the plaintiff was subject to counterclaims "to the
extent that it affords recoupment against ... [the plaintiff], but not be-
yond the point where affirmative relief is to be granted. ' 251 Similarly, in
Hungarian People's Republic v. Cecil Associates, Inc.,252 a federal district
242. T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140, Chamber
2, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. (1984).
243. See supra note 170.
244. See, e.g., First National Bank of Boston (International) v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 685 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1981).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran, June 11, 1984, Case No.
48, Chamber 3, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. (1984).
248. Id. at 15.
249. See, e.g., United States v. National City Bank of New York, 83 F.2d at 237;
Looper, supra note 200, at 652.
250. 105 F. Supp. 411 (D.D.C. 1952).
251. Id. at 412.
252. 118 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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court held that a counterclaim for damages in excess of the plaintiff Gov-
ernment's claim for return of a $9,000 security deposit was not permissi-
ble. The court held that the respondent's counterclaim was limited to the
extent of the award to the plaintiff and thus was purely defensive.
2 5 3
This federal rule governing the extent of the award on a counterclaim
was recently applied to a foreign State counterclaimant. In First National
Bank of Boston,254 the Second Circuit allowed Banco Nacional to coun-
terclaim against Boston's assignee, BBI, but "limited to the amount of
the assignee's recovery. "255 In Menendez v. Saks & Co., 25 6 involving
Cuba's expropriation of five leading manufacturers of Havana cigars, the
Second Circuit interpreted First National City Bank as holding that
counterclaims could be asserted against claimant-interventors up to the
amount of the original claim, 257 but reversed the district court's award in
excess of the original claim.
2 5 8
D. Summary
Should an international tribunal, especially one to which the United
States is a Party, seek an analogy to principles of American municipal law
in cases involving counterclaims between a private party and a foreign
sovereign, it will find that (1) the defendant's counterclaim must relate to
the original claim; (2) without a claim there can be no counterclaim; and,
(3) the counterclaim may not exceed in amount the original claim or the
judgment awarded.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that the international law rules regard-
ing counterclaims are generally rather narrow and require that a counter-
claim be related in some direct and tangible way to the original claim.
This is certainly true in the international judicial arena, where the rules
and decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the
International Court of Justice require a direct connection between a
counterclaim and the original claim. Similarly, in international arbitra-
tion between States and between a State and a private party, the conven-
tions establishing the arbitral tribunals universally provide for a narrow
interpretation of permissible counterclaims.
On a substantive level, the following principles may be seen as gov-
erning counterclaims in international arbitrations involving States or a
State and a foreign private party. First, a counterclaim is permitted only
if it relates to the original claim, contract or transaction. Second, a coun-
253. Id. at 958.
254. 658 F.2d 895.
255. Id. at 902.
256. 485 F.2d 1355.
257. Id. at 1374.
258. Id.
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terclaim cannot exist independently of the original claim and therefore
should the latter be disallowed (procedurally) or dismissed on the merits
(substantively), the counterclaim also must be rendered inadmissible
(procedurally) or non-justiciable (on the merits), for want of jurisdiction
of the tribunal. The same reasoning applies to counterclaims should the
claim be withdrawn before a counterclaim is filed. Third, a counterclaim
in excess of the original claim, although admissible, cannot be awarded,
for it will be, in the amount of the excess, tantamount to an affirmative
award.
Similarly, the rules and decisions of the tribunals, where the conven-
tion or compromis is silent, have generally admitted counterclaims where
there is a direct link between the counterclaim and claim. Finally, it was
shown that in U.S. federal courts, especially in cases involving third party
assignees as successors in interest to a claim against a foreign sovereign,
only counterclaims directly related to the original claim are allowed. The
only exception to the "same transaction" rule developed by the federal
courts is the "same claim" standard applied in cases involving an action
between a foreign sovereign and private parties. This latter standard
stems from equitable considerations and is invoked when an unduly nar-
row interpretation of permissible counterclaims would appear unjust.
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